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a monetary Schumpeterian growth model with matching frictions in the labor market and
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constraint on R&D, higher ination that raises the opportunity cost of cash holdings leads to
a decrease in innovation and economic growth, which in turn decreases labor-market tightness
and increases unemployment. Under the CIA constraint on consumption, higher ination
instead decreases unemployment in addition to stiing innovation and economic growth.
Therefore, the two CIA constraints have drastically di¤erent implications on the long-run
relationship between ination and unemployment. This theoretical result is consistent with
our empirical nding and provides a plausible explanation (via the relative magnitude of the
two CIA constraints) for the mixed empirical results on the relationship between ination
and unemployment in the literature. Finally, we also calibrate our model to aggregate data
in the US and Eurozone to explore quantitative implications on the relationship between
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1 Introduction
The relationship between ination, unemployment and economic growth has long been a funda-
mental question in economics. This study provides a growth-theoretic analysis on this important
relationship in a Schumpeterian model with equilibrium unemployment. Creative destruction
refers to the process through which new technologies destroy existing rms. On the one hand, the
destructive part of this process leads to job losses. On the other hand, new technologies also create
new rms with new employment opportunities. In a frictionless labor market, these job destruc-
tions and job creations could o¤set each other leaving the labor market with full employment.
However, given the presence of matching frictions between rms and workers, this continuous
turnover in the labor market as a result of creative destruction leads to what Joseph Schumpeter
(1939) referred to as "technological unemployment". At the rst glance, it may seem that tech-
nological unemployment is a very specic kind of unemployment; however, as Schumpeter [1911]
(2003, p.89) wrote, "[i]t doubtlessly explains a good deal of the phenomenon of unemployment, in
my opinion its better half."
To explore the e¤ects of ination on unemployment and economic growth, we introduce money
demand via cash-in-advance (CIA) constraints on consumption and R&D investment into a Schum-
peterian growth model with equilibrium unemployment. Early empirical studies such as Hall
(1992) and Opler et al. (1999) nd a positive and signicant relationship between R&D and cash
ows in US rms. Bates et al. (2009) document that the average cash-to-assets ratio in US rms
increased substantially from 1980 to 2006 and argue that this is partly driven by their rising R&D
expenditures. Brown and Petersen (2011) provide evidence that rms smooth R&D expenditures
by maintaining a bu¤er stock of liquidity in the form of cash reserves. Berentsen et al. (2012)
argue that information frictions and limited collateral value of intangible R&D capital may prevent
rms from nancing R&D investment through debt or equity forcing them to fund R&D projects
with cash reserves. Falato and Sim (2014) provide causal evidence for R&D being an important
determinant of rms cash holdings. They use rm-level data in the US to show that rms cash
holdings increase (decrease) signicantly in response to a rise (cut) in R&D tax credits, which vary
across states and time. Furthermore, these e¤ects are stronger for rms that have less access to
debt/equity nancing. These results suggest that due to the presence of nancing frictions, rms
need to hold cash to nance their R&D investment. We capture these cash requirements on R&D
using a CIA constraint as in Chu and Cozzi (2014).
Under the CIA constraint on R&D, an increase in ination that determines the opportunity
cost of cash holdings raises the cost of R&D investment. Consequently, higher ination decreases
R&D. Given that we consider a semi-endogenous-growth version of the Schumpeterian model in
which the long-run rate of creative destruction is determined by exogenous parameters,1 a decrease
in R&D leads to a decrease in the growth rate of technology only in the short run but decreases the
level of technology in the long run. Although the rate of creative destruction decreases temporarily,
the decrease in innovation in the long run increases the number of unemployed workers relative
to labor-market vacancies causing a negative e¤ect on labor market tightness and a positive e¤ect
on unemployment. In other words, via the CIA constraint on R&D, higher ination increases
unemployment in the long run by decreasing the demand for workers.
We also consider a conventional CIA constraint on consumption. Interestingly, under the CIA
constraint on consumption, higher ination instead decreases unemployment in addition to stiing
innovation and economic growth, which is measured by the growth of technology in the short run
1See Jones (1999) for a discussion of the semi-endogenous growth model.
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and the level of technology in the long run. Intuitively, higher ination leads to an increase in
the opportunity cost of cash holdings, which in turn increases the cost of consumption relative to
leisure. As a result, the household consumes more leisure and reduces labor supply. The decrease
in labor supply reduces R&D labor and also the number of workers searching for employment. The
resulting increase in labor-market tightness decreases unemployment. In other words, via the CIA
constraint on consumption, higher ination decreases unemployment by decreasing the supply of
labor.
Therefore, the two CIA constraints have drastically di¤erent implications on the long-run
relationship between ination and unemployment. This theoretical result is consistent with our
empirical nding. We use data in the US and consider two variables that capture nancial frictions
faced by rms and consumers, respectively. We nd that ination has a positive (negative) e¤ect
on unemployment via the nancial friction faced by rms (consumers), which is a proxy for the CIA
constraint on R&D (consumption). Our analysis provides a plausible explanation (via the relative
magnitude of the two CIA constraints) for the mixed empirical results on the relationship between
ination and unemployment in the literature.2 Finally, we calibrate our model to aggregate data in
the US to explore quantitative implications and nd that the model delivers a positive (negative)
relationship between ination and unemployment when we use data on M0 (M1) as the measure
of money. Interestingly, when we calibrate the model to data in the Eurozone, we nd that the
model delivers a negative relationship between ination and unemployment under both measures
of money. We discuss intuition behind these results in the main text.
This study relates to the literature on Schumpeterian growth; see Aghion and Howitt (1992),
Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Segerstrom et al. (1990) for seminal studies and Aghion,
Akcigit and Howitt (2014) for a recent survey. However, these seminal studies and many subse-
quent studies in this literature feature full employment rendering them unsuitable for the purpose
of analyzing unemployment. Early contributions in the Schumpeterian theory of unemployment
are Aghion and Howitt (1994, 1998), Cerisier and Postel-Vinay (1998), Mortensen and Pissarides
(1998), Pissarides (2000), S¸ener (2000, 2001) and Postel-Vinay (2002).3 A recent study by Aghion,
Akcigit, Deaton and Roulet (2016) explores the e¤ects of job creation and job destruction on
the welfare of workers in a Schumpeterian model with unemployment and uses data on subjec-
tive wellbeing to verify their theoretical results. The present study complements these interesting
studies by introducing money demand into the Schumpeterian model with unemployment and
analyzing the e¤ects of ination on unemployment and economic growth. To our knowledge, this
combination of Schumpeterian growth, money demand and equilibrium unemployment is novel to
the literature.
This study also relates to the literature on ination and economic growth. In this literature,
Stockman (1981) and Abel (1985) analyze the e¤ects of ination via a CIA constraint on capital
investment in a monetary version of the Neoclassical growth model. Subsequent studies in this
literature explore the e¤ects of ination in variants of the capital-based growth model. This study
instead relates more closely to the literature on ination and innovation-driven growth. In this
literature, an early study by Marquis and Re¤ett (1994) analyzes the e¤ects of ination via a
CIA constraint on consumption in a variety-expanding growth model based on Romer (1990).4
2For example, Ireland (1999), Beyer and Farmer (2007), Russell and Banerjee (2008) and Berentsen et al. (2011)
document a positive relationship between ination and unemployment in the US, whereas Dolado et al. (2000) and
Karanassou et al. (2005, 2008) nd a negative relationship between ination and unemployment in the US and
some European countries.
3See also Parello (2010) who considers a Schumpeterian model with unemployment due to e¢ciency wage.
4See also Arawatari et al. (2018) who consider monetary policy in the Romer variety-expanding model with
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In contrast, we explore the e¤ects of ination in a Schumpeterian quality-ladder model with
creative destruction that gives rise to technological unemployment. Chu and Lai (2013), Chu
and Cozzi (2014), Chu, Cozzi, Lai and Liao (2015), He and Zou (2016), Chu, Cozzi, Furukawa
and Liao (2017, 2019), Huang et al. (2017), He (2018), Lin et al. (2019) and Zheng et al.
(2019) also analyze the relationship between ination and economic growth in the Schumpeterian
model; however, these studies exhibit full employment due to the absence of matching frictions in
the labor market. Hori (2019) considers nancial frictions in a monetary Schumpeterian growth
model, whereas the present study provides a novel contribution to the literature by introducing
equilibrium unemployment driven by matching frictions to the monetary Schumpeterian growth
model. Studies by Heer (2003), Wang and Xie (2013) and Chen et al. (2018) also analyze the
e¤ects of ination on economic growth and unemployment driven by matching frictions in the
labor market. Their models generate money demand via CIA constraints on consumption and/or
wage payment to production workers. In contrast, we model money demand via a CIA constraint
on R&D. More importantly, they consider capital accumulation as the engine of economic growth
whereas our analysis complements these interesting studies by exploring a di¤erent growth engine
that is R&D and innovation.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 documents some stylized facts. Section
3 describes the Schumpeterian model. Section 4 provides a qualitative analysis on the e¤ects of
ination on unemployment and economic growth. Section 5 presents our quantitative results. The
nal section concludes.
2 Stylized facts
In this section, we document some stylized facts on the relationship between ination and unem-
ployment in the US. We consider the following regression specication:
uit =  1t +  2t BCt +  3t BFt +  4t BFt RDi +  5t RDi
+ 6BFt RDi +  7BCt +  8BFt +	Xi;t + 'i + "it;
where uit is the unemployment rate in industry i at time t,
5 t is the ination rate computed from
the consumer price index in the US at time t, BFt is bank lending policy to rms at time t, BCt
is bank lending policy to individual consumers at time t, and RDi is the average level of R&D
intensity in industry i.6 Xi;t is a vector of other explanatory variables, which include GDP per
capita in the US, the log of trade volume (i.e., import plus export) in the US and industry-specic
time trends. 'i is the industry xed e¤ect.
Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Stein (1998), Van den Heuvel
(2002) and Bolton and Freixas (2006) show that bank lending a¤ects the transmission of monetary
policy to the real economy. The tightness of bank lending determines the nancing abilities of rms
(BFt) and individual consumers (BCt). Therefore, we treat BFt as a proxy for the CIA constraint
heterogeneity in the productivity of R&D entrepreneurs.
5Data on the unemployment rate is collected from the Current Population Survey of the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS). The BLS releases yearly reports on the unemployment rate by industry. Because data is not
available for 2000 2001, we use data from 1998 1999 and 2002 2017.
6Data on industry-level R&D intensity is from Kugler and Verhoogen (2012); see also Sutton (1991, 1998).
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faced by rms and BCt as a proxy for the CIA constraint faced by consumers. US Federal Reserve
Board conducts a quarterly survey of eighty domestic banks and twenty-four foreign banks with
US branches/agencies on their lending policies to rms and consumers from 1998 to 2017.7 The
survey classies the tightness reported by banks on lending to rms and individuals into ve levels:
tightened considerably, tightened somewhat, unchanged, eased somewhat and eased considerably.8
Here BFt (BCt) is computed as the percentage of banks that report lending policies on rms
(consumers) being tightened "considerably" or "somewhat".
Table 1: Correlation between unemployment and ination
considerably or somewhat only considerably
All banks Large banks All banks Large banks
BFt > BCt 0.3671 0.3675 0.3548 0.3548
BCt > BFt -0.4306 -0.4417 -0.4906 -0.4882
Table 1 reports the correlations between unemployment and ination under di¤erent states
of bank lending policies reported by banks. Table 1 shows that unemployment and ination are
positively correlated if BFt > BCt (i.e., rms face a stronger degree of nancial frictions than
consumers). Table 1 also shows that unemployment and ination are negatively correlated if
BCt > BFt (i.e., consumers face a stronger degree of nancial frictions than rms).
Table 2 reports our main empirical results. The rst three columns correspond to lending
policies reported by all banks, whereas the last three columns correspond to policies reported by
only large banks. Column (1) shows that the coe¢cient on the interaction term between ination
and BFt is positive and signicant whereas it is negative and signicant for the interaction between
ination and BCt. This pattern is consistent with Table 1. This means that higher ination
increases the unemployment rate if bank lending policy is tightened for rms, but decreases the
unemployment rate if lending policy is tightened for consumers instead. In column (2), we add
a triple interaction term of ination, R&D intensity and BFt in the regression. Given that a
larger R&D intensity may indicate that rms need to borrow more for R&D activities and face a
tighter constraint as a result, we expect a positive coe¢cient on this triple interaction term. As
expected, the coe¢cient on the triple interaction term in column (2) is positive and signicant,
which means that higher ination increases the unemployment rate more in the industries that are
more exposed to R&D nancing constraints. Furthermore, it should be noted that the coe¢cient on
the interaction term between ination and BCt is still negative and signicant. In column (3), we
add other control variables, including GDP per capita, the log of trade volume and industry-specic
time trends. In this case, the coe¢cient on the triple interaction term continues to be positive and
signicant whereas the coe¢cient on the interaction between ination and BCt remains negative
and signicant. When we use data on large banks only in columns (4)-(6), the above results still
hold. We also consider focusing on the case of bank lending policies being tightened "considerably"
as a robustness check for which the results are similar and reported in Appendix A.
In this section, we have documented the following stylized facts. First, under the nancial
friction faced by rms (i.e., a proxy for the CIA constraint on R&D), higher ination increases
7We take an average of the quarterly data to construct yearly data for the regression.
8Bank lending data is from the CEIC database.
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Table 2: E¤ects of ination on unemployment
All banks Large banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BF  Ination 0.389*** 0.320*** 0.192 0.367*** 0.296*** 0.191
(0.096) (0.096) (0.140) (0.083) (0.086) (0.119)
BC  Ination -0.504*** -0.504*** -0.398*** -0.368*** -0.368*** -0.304***
(0.104) (0.101) (0.144) (0.070) (0.068) (0.091)
RD  BF  Ination 2.231*** 2.547*** 2.323** 2.723***
(0.805) (0.887) (0.916) (1.037)
RD  BF -7.526*** -8.641*** -7.634*** -9.002***
(2.353) (2.670) (2.700) (3.145)
RD  Ination -12.459 -24.992 -11.163 -24.964
(24.413) (28.143) (25.320) (30.000)
Ination, BF and BC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls No No Yes No No Yes
Industry xed e¤ect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 252 252 252 252 252 252
R-squared 0.341 0.385 0.399 0.346 0.384 0.393
Notes: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1. The rst three columns correspond to lending policy
reported by all banks, whereas the last three columns correspond to lending policy reported by
large banks. In all columns, we control ination, bank policy for rms (BF) and bank policy for
consumers (BC). In columns (3) and (6), we further control GDP per capita, log trade volume
and industry-specifc time trends.
unemployment. Second, under the nancial friction faced by consumers (i.e., a proxy for the
CIA constraint on consumption), higher ination instead decreases unemployment. Finally, when
higher ination increases unemployment, this e¤ect is larger in the industries that have higher
R&D intensity.
3 A monetary Schumpeterian model with unemployment
In the Schumpeterian model developed by Aghion and Howitt (1992), economic growth is driven by
quality improvement. R&D entrepreneurs invent higher-quality products in order to dominate the
market and earn monopolistic prots. After R&D entrepreneurs create new inventions, they open
up vacancies to search for workers in the labor market,9 in which the number of job separations is
determined by creative destruction and the number of job matches is determined by an aggregate
matching function and labor market tightness. Due to matching frictions between workers and
rms with new technologies, the economy features equilibrium unemployment in the long run.
Unlike the important precedent of Mortensen (2005), we (a) consider semi-endogenous growth
via increasing R&D di¢culty as in Segerstrom (1998), (b) introduce money demand via CIA
constraints on R&D investment and consumption as in Chu and Cozzi (2014), and (c) consider
elastic labor supply.
9Michelacci (2003) develops a search-theoretic R&D-based growth model in which after R&D scientists create
new inventions, they have to search for entrepreneurs to implement these inventions.
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3.1 Household
The representative household has L members. The households utility function is given by
U =
Z
1
0
e t [ln ct +  ln(L  lt)] dt, (1)
where ct denotes the households total consumption of nal good (numeraire) at time t. Each
member of the household supplies one unit of labor, and lt is the households total supply of labor
at time t. The parameter  > 0 determines subjective discounting, and   0 determines leisure
preference.
The asset-accumulation equation expressed in real terms is given by
_at + _mt = rtat   tmt + itdt + It    t   ct. (2)
at is the real value of nancial assets (in the form of equity shares in monopolistic intermediate
goods rms) owned by the household. rt is the real interest rate. t is the ination rate. mt is
the real money balance accumulated by the household. dt is the amount of money lent to R&D
entrepreneurs subject to the following constraint: dt + ct  mt, where  2 [0; 1] parameterizes
the strength of the CIA constraint on consumption. The interest rate on money lending dt to
R&D rms is the nominal interest rate,10 which is equal to it = rt + t from the Fisher identity.
 t is a lump-sum tax levied on the household. It is the total amount of labor income given by
It  wtxt + !tRt + btut,
11 where wt is the wage rate of production workers xt, !t is the wage rate
of R&D workers Rt, and bt is unemployment benets provided to unemployed workers ut who are
searching for jobs in the labor market.12 To ensure balanced growth, we assume that bt = byt=L is
proportional to output per capita, where b 2 (0; 1) is an unemployment-benet parameter. Given
the labor force lt, the resource constraint on labor at time t is
xt +Rt + ut = lt. (3)
The household chooses consumption ct and labor supply lt and accumulates assets at and
money mt to maximize (1) subject to (2), (3) and the CIA constraint dt+ ct  mt. The resulting
optimality condition for labor supply is
lt = L 
(1 + it)ct
!t
, (4)
where the opportunity cost of leisure is the R&D wage rate !t because individuals can freely
choose between employment in the R&D sector and job search.13 The intertemporal optimality
condition is given by
 
_t
t
= rt   , (5)
10It can be easily shown as a no-arbitrage condition that the interest rate on dt must be equal to it.
11The household pools the di¤erent sources of labor income among members, who share all the risks. See
Michelacci and Schivardi (2013) for an interesting analysis on how idiosyncratic risks a¤ect entrepreneurial activity
and growth.
12Here we assume a uniform level of unemployment benets for all unemployed workers. Michelacci and Ru¤o
(2015) explore the welfare implications of age-dependent unemployment benets and nd that an optimal unem-
ployment replacement rate should decline with age.
13For simplicity, we do not assume R&D to be preceded by another search activity given that it is essentially the
search for a higher-quality product.
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where t is the Hamiltonian co-state variable on (2) and determined by t = [(1+ it)ct]
 1. In the
case of a constant nominal interest rate i, (5) becomes the familiar Euler equation _ct=ct = rt   .
3.2 Final good
Final good yt are produced by perfectly competitive rms that aggregate a unit continuum of
intermediate goods using the following Cobb-Douglas aggregator:
yt = exp
Z 1
0
ln [At(j)xt(j)] dj

, (6)
where At(j)  q
nt(j) is the productivity or quality level of intermediate good xt(j).
14 The pa-
rameter q > 1 is the exogenous step size of each quality improvement, and nt(j) is the number
of innovations that have been invented and implemented in industry j as of time t. From prot
maximization, the conditional demand function for xt(j) is
xt(j) = yt=pt(j), (7)
where pt(j) is the price of xt(j) for j 2 [0; 1]. All prices are denominated in units of nal good,
chosen as the numeraire.
3.3 Intermediate goods
Di¤erentiated intermediate goods are produced in a unit continuum of industries. Each industry
is temporarily dominated by a quality leader until the arrival and implementation of the next
higher-quality product. The owner of the new innovation becomes the next quality leader.15 The
current quality leader in industry j uses one unit of labor to produce one unit of intermediate
good xt(j). We assume - as in Mortensen (2005) - that the employer has no outside option and
each workers outside option is unemployment benet bt. In this case, we specify the generalized
Nash bargaining game on wage as16
wt(j) = argmax[wt(j)  bt]
[pt(j)  wt(j)]
1 , (8)
where the parameter  2 (0; 1)measures the bargaining power of workers. The bargaining outcome
on wage is
wt(j) = pt(j) + (1  )bt, (9)
which is an average between the marginal revenue product pt(j) of a worker and the value of
unemployment benet bt weighted by the bargaining power. The employer and the worker commit
to this wage schedule over the lifetime of the rm. Substituting (9) into the prot function yields
t(j) = [pt(j)  wt(j)]xt(j) = (1  )[pt(j)  bt]xt(j) = (1  )[yt   btxt(j)], (10)
14Given we will assume that one unit of labor produces one unit of intermediate goods, we use xt to denote both
the quantity of intermediate goods and the quantity of production workers, for notational convenience.
15This is known as the Arrow replacement e¤ect; see Cozzi (2007a) for a discussion of the Arrow e¤ect.
16Using a more general bargaining condition with the value functions of employment and unemployment would
complicate the model without providing new insight; see for example footnote 3 in Mortensen (2005).
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where the second equality uses (9) and the third equality uses (7).
In Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), the markup is assumed to
be given by the quality step size q, due to limit pricing between the current and previous quality
leaders. Here we follow Howitt (1999) and Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) to consider a more
realistic scenario in which new quality leaders do not engage in limit pricing with previous quality
leaders because after the implementation of the newest innovations, previous quality leaders exit
the market and need to search for workers before reentering. Given the Cobb-Douglas aggregator
in (6), the unconstrained monopolistic price would be innity (i.e., xt(j) ! 0). We follow Evans
et al. (2003) to consider price regulation under which the regulated markup ratio cannot be
greater than z > 1, which enables us to separate the markup z and the quality step size q.17 The
equilibrium price is
pt(j) = zwt(j) = z
1  
1  z
bt, (11)
where the second equality uses (9). We impose an additional parameter restriction given by z < 1.
Substituting (11) into (7) yields
xt(j) =
1  z
(1  )z
yt
bt
=
1  z
(1  )zb
L  x, (12)
where the last equality uses bt = byt=L. Finally, the amount of monopolistic prot is
t(j) = t = (pt   wt)x =
z   1
z
yt. (13)
Given that the amount of monopolistic prot is the same across industries, we will follow the
standard treatment in the literature to focus on the symmetric equilibrium, in which the arrival
rate of innovations is equal across industries.18
3.4 R&D
R&D is performed by a continuum of competitive entrepreneurs. If an R&D entrepreneur sinkseRt units of labor to engage in innovation in an industry, then she is successful in inventing the
next higher-quality product in the industry with an instantaneous probability given by
et = ht eRt
At
, (14)
where ht is an exogenous process of research productivity that increases at a constant rate g.
19 We
assume that research productivity ht=At decreases in aggregate quality At  exp
R 1
0
lnAt(j)dj

17This formulation allows us to perform a more realistic calibration exercise.
18See Cozzi (2007b) for a discussion of multiple equilibria in the Schumpeterian model. Cozzi et al. (2007)
provide a theoretical justication for the symmetric equilibrium to be the unique rational-expectation equilibrium
in the Schumpeterian model.
19Research productivity may improve over time due to human capital accumulation. For simplicity, we do not
model this process explicitly, but we nonetheless introduce this exogenous component into our model for two
reasons. Theoretically, without population growth, the semi-endogenous growth model requires an exogenous
growth component to sustain long-run growth. Empirically, previous studies nd a residual exogenous growth
component when using data to calibrate or estimate R&D-based growth models; see for example Comin (2004) and
Cozzi et al. (2017).
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in order to capture increasing di¢culty of R&D in the economy,20 and this specication gives
rise to semi-endogenous growth as in Segerstrom (1998).21 The expected benet from investing
in R&D is Vtetdt, where Vt is the value of the expected discounted prots generated by a new
innovation and etdt is the entrepreneurs probability of having a successful innovation during the
innitesimal time interval dt. To facilitate the payment of R&D wages, the entrepreneur borrows
money from the household, and the cost of borrowing is determined by the nominal interest rate
it.
22 To parameterize the strength of this CIA constraint on R&D, we assume that a fraction
 2 [0; 1] of R&D expenditure requires the borrowing of money from households. Therefore, the
total cost of R&D is (1 + it)!t eRtdt.23 Free entry implies
Vtetdt = (1 + it)!t eRtdt, Vt = (1 + it)!tAt=ht, (15)
where the second equality uses (14).
3.5 Matching and unemployment
When an R&D entrepreneur has a new innovation, she is not able to immediately launch the new
product to the market due to matching frictions in the recruitment of manufacturing workers.24
Instead, she has to open up x vacancies to recruit x workers for producing and launching her
products to the market. We follow the standard treatment in the search-and-matching literature
to consider an aggregate matching function F (vt; ut), where vt is the number of vacancies in the
labor market and ut is the number of unemployed workers. F (vt; ut) has the usual properties of
being increasing, concave and homogeneous of degree one in vt and ut. In the economy, the number
of successful matches at time t is given by F (vt; ut); in other words, the number of workers who
nd jobs is F (vt; ut). Therefore, the job-nding rate is
t = F (vt; ut)=ut = F (vt=ut; 1) M(t), (16)
where t  vt=ut denotes labor market tightness, and t = M(t) is increasing in t. Similarly,
the number of vacancies lled is also F (vt; ut), so the vacancy-lling rate is
t = F (vt; ut)=vt =M(t)=t, (17)
20See Venturini (2012) for empirical evidence based on US manufacturing data that supports the semi-endogenous
growth model with increasing di¢culty of R&D.
21Segerstrom (1998) considers an industry-specic index of R&D di¢culty. Here we consider an aggregate index
of R&D di¢culty to simplify notation without altering the aggregate results of our analysis.
22Due to the static nature of the R&D sector, we cannot allow R&D entrepreneurs to accumulate cash. However,
even if we were to allow this, higher ination would still increase the cost of R&D as in our current setting in
which entrepreneurs borrow cash from the household because the opportunity cost of nancing R&D with cash is
determined by it in both cases.
23As in Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991), we assume the presence of a nancial
market. In a perfectly competitive banking sector without moral hazard, an entrepreneur can borrow from banks,
which would charge a lending rate that reects just the probability of the entrepreneurs R&D project being
successful. If the entrepreneurs R&D project succeeds (fails), then he/she pays (does not pay) back the banks.
Thus, one should think of the cost of R&D as an expected cost; i.e., (1 + it)!t eRt = etIt (1 + it)!t eRt+(1 et)0,
where It = 1=et is the gross lending rate.
24Dinopoulos et al. (2013) consider an interesting setting, aimed at studying the importance of rent-seeking
activities on unemployment, in which new rms are able to immediately recruit a fraction  2 (0; 1) of the desired
number of workers x.
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where t = M(t)=t is decreasing in t. Following the usual treatment in the literature,
25 we
assume that when matching occurs to a rm at time t, the rm matches with x workers simul-
taneously. In other words, the number of successful matches at time t is rst determined by the
matching function F (vt; ut), and then, these matches are randomly assigned to F (vt; ut)=x rms.
Therefore, the probability for a rm with opened vacancies to match with x workers at time t is
also t.
3.6 Value functions
Each unemployed worker faces the probability t of being employed at any point in time. Once
a worker is hired by a rm, he/she begins employment and faces the probability et of the next
innovation being invented in his/her industry. After the innovation is invented, the worker faces
the probability t of the next innovation being implemented and his/her rm being forced out of
the market due to creative destruction. Let Ut denote the value of being unemployed. The familiar
asset-pricing equation of Ut is
rt =
bt + _Ut + t(Wt   Ut)
Ut
, (18)
where bt is unemployment benet, t is the rate at which an unemployed worker becomes employed
and Wt denotes the value of being employed in an industry in which the subsequent innovation
has not been invented. The asset-pricing equation of Wt is
rt =
wt + _Wt + et(St  Wt)
Wt
, (19a)
where wt is the wage of a production worker, et is the rate at which the subsequent innovation is
invented and St denotes the value of being employed in an industry in which the subsequent inno-
vation has been invented but not yet been launched to the market.26 The asset-pricing equation
of St is
rt =
wt + _St + t(Ut   St)
St
, (19b)
where t is the rate at which the subsequent innovation is launched to the market and the worker
becomes unemployed. Given that a worker must be indi¤erent between being employed by an
R&D entrepreneur and engaging in job search, the wage of R&D workers is equal to
!t = rtUt   _Ut. (20)
The life cycle of an innovation can be described as follows. When an innovation is invented, its
owner creates vacancies in the labor market to recruit workers, and the probability of successfully
recruiting workers and beginning production at any point in time is t. Once an innovation is
launched to the market, it faces the probability et of the next innovation being invented. The
subsequent innovation cannot be invented until the current innovation has been launched to the
25See for example Mortensen (2005) and Dinopoulos et al. (2013).
26Unlike Mortensen (2005) who assumes that the current quality leader must stop its operation as soon as the
next innovation is invented, we allow the current quality leader to continue its operation until the next innovation
is implemented. This generalization is rational for the current quality leader, who continues to earn prots, and
also for the workers because St > Ut.
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market and directly observed.27 After the next innovation is invented, the probability of it being
launched to the market is t. Once the next innovation is launched to the market, the value of the
current innovation becomes zero. Let Vt be the value of a new innovation for which its vacancies
have not been lled. Its asset-pricing equation is given by
rt =
_Vt + t (Zt   Vt)
Vt
, (21a)
where t is the rate at which the product is launched to the market. The asset-pricing equation
of Zt, which is the value of the innovation when its vacancies have been lled, is given by
rt =
t + _Zt + et (Xt   Zt)
Zt
, (21b)
where t is the monopolistic prot earned by a launched product and et is the rate at which the
subsequent innovation is invented. The asset-pricing equation of Xt, which is the value of the
current innovation when the subsequent innovation has been invented but not yet been launched
to the market, is given by
rt =
t + _Xt   tXt
Xt
, (21c)
where t is the rate at which the subsequent innovation is launched to the market and the current
monopolist loses the market.
3.7 Government
The monetary policy instrument that we consider is the ination rate t, which is exogenously
set by the monetary authority. Given t, the nominal interest rate is endogenously determined
according to the Fisher identity such that it = t + rt, where rt is the real interest rate. The
growth rate of the nominal money supply is t = t + _mt=mt.
28 Finally, the government nances
the scal decit btut    t by printing money subject to the following balanced-budget condition:
tmt = btut    t.
3.8 Steady-state equilibrium
We will dene the aggregate innovation-arrival rate as t  (1  ft)et, where ft is the measure of
industries with unlaunched innovations. The outow from the pool of rms searching for workers
is given by tft, and the inow into this pool is given by (1   ft)
et = t. Therefore, in the
27This assumption, shared by Mortensen (2005), captures the realistic feature of the intertemporal spillovers,
of equally beneting from patent description and actual use of the good. This aspect is often remarked in the
microeconomic literature on innovation.
28It is useful to note that in this model, it is the growth rate of the money supply that a¤ects the real economy in
the long run, and a one-time change in the level of money supply has no long-run e¤ect on the real economy. This
is the well-known distinction between the neutrality and superneutrality of money. Empirical evidence generally
favors neutrality and rejects superneutrality, consistent with our model; see Fisher and Seater (1993) for a discussion
on the neutrality and superneutrality of money.
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steady state, we must have tft = t. The aggregate production function of nal good is given by
yt = Atx, where (the log of) aggregate technology At is dened as
lnAt 
Z 1
0
lnAt(j)dj =
Z 1
0
nt(j)dj ln q =
Z t
0
fd ln q, (22)
where we have normalized A0 = 1 (i.e., lnA0 = 0). Di¤erentiating (22) with respect to t yields
_At=At = tft ln q, where tft is the measure of industries with newly launched innovations at time
t. The steady-state growth rate of At is
_At
At
= f ln q =  ln q = g, (23)
where the third equality holds because R and  = htR=At are constant on the balanced growth
path implying that ht and At both grow at the exogenous rate g in the long run.
29 From the
last equality of (23), the steady-state rate of creative destruction is determined by exogenous
parameters such that  = g= ln q.
On the balanced growth path,30 (20) becomes
!t = Ut. (24)
Solving (18) and (19) yields the balanced-growth value of Ut given by
Ut = 
(+ ) (+ e)bt + (+  + e)wt
(+ ) (+ e) (+ )  e , (25)
where e = =(1  f) = =(1  =). From (21), the balanced-growth value of Vt is
Vt =
(t + eXt)
(+ )(+ e) = +  + e(+ )2(+ e)t. (26)
Substituting (24)-(26) into the R&D free-entry condition in (15) yields
+  + e
(+ )2(+ e)t = Atht  (1 + i) (+ ) (+ e)bt + (+  + e)wt(+ ) (+ e) (+ )  e . (27)
For convenience, we dene a transformed variable t  At=ht, which is the level of R&D di¢culty
(measured by aggregate technology) relative to innovation productivity. Substituting (11), (13)
and bt = byt=L into (27) and then rearranging terms yield
 =
z   1
(1 + i) zb
L
(+ e) (+ ) (+ e) (+ )  e(+ ) (+ e) + (+  + e)(1  )=(1  z)(), (28)
29The semi-endogenous growth model does not require the growth rate of technology to be equal to the rate g.
If we consider a more general specication  = htR=A

t , then _At=At = g= in the long run. We consider a special
case  = 1 for simplicity.
30It is useful to note that on the balanced growth path, the following set of variables fl; x; R; u; vg is constant,
whereas the remaining variables fAt; wt; !t; yt; ct; bt;t; Ut;Wt; St; Vt; Xt; Ztg grow at the rate g.
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where e = =(1  =),  =M(),  =M()= and
() 

+ 
 
1 +
e
+ 
!
.
We refer to (28) as the R&D free-entry (FE) condition, which contains two endogenous variables
f; g.31 It is useful to note that the FE condition depends on the nominal interest rate i via
the CIA constraint on R&D (i.e.,  > 0). From the R&D free-entry condition in (15), we have
 = [ (1 + i)] 1V=U , where we have also used (24). Whenever an increase in labor market
tightness  reduces the vacancy-lling rate  and increases the job-nding rate , it decreases the
value V of an invention relative to the value U of unemployment, which in turn requires  to fall
in the long run in order for the R&D free-entry condition to hold. We summarize this result in
Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 The FE curve shows a negative relationship between  and  if  is su¢ciently large.
Proof. See Appendix B.
To close the model, we use the following steady-state condition that equates the inow  into
the pool of rms searching for workers to its outow f :32
 = f = v=x =M()u=x. (29)
The second equality follows from fx = v, where f is the number of rms with opened vacancies
and x is the number of vacancies per rm. The third equality in (29) follows from (17) and uses
the denition of   v=u. Furthermore, we need to derive the equilibrium supply of labor l.
Substituting (11), (24), (25), bt = byt=L and ct = yt into labor supply in (4) yields
l( i
 
; 
+
)=L = 1 
(1 + i)
b
(+ ) (+ e) (+ )  e
(+ ) (+ e) + (+  + e)(1  )=(1  z) , (30)
which is increasing in  if  is su¢ciently large as we will show in the proof of Lemma 2. Substi-
tuting (3), (12), (14) and (30) into (29) and applying the denition of   A=h yield
 =
L


l( i
 
; 
+
)=L 

1 +

M()

1  z
(1  )zb

. (31)
We refer to (31) as the labor-market (LM) condition, which also contains two endogenous variables
f; g. It is useful to note that the LM condition depends on the nominal interest rate i via the
CIA constraint on consumption (i.e.,  > 0). From (14), we have  = R=. An increase in
labor-market tightness  reduces unemployment u, which in turn increases labor for R&D R. As a
result of increased R&D, innovation becomes more di¢cult (i.e.,  increases) in the long run, and
this e¤ect is present regardless of whether labor supply is elastic or inelastic. We summarize this
result in Lemma 2. Finally, (28) and (31) can be used to solve for the steady-state equilibrium
values of f; g; see Figure 1 for an illustration.
Lemma 2 The LM curve shows a positive relationship between  and  if  is su¢ciently large.
Proof. See Appendix B.
31Recall that  = g= ln q is determined by exogenous parameters in the steady state.
32This condition can also be derived from imposing steady state on the following law of motion for unemployment:
_u = x  u = [(=f)  ]v, in which the second equality uses f  v=x and u = v.
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Figure 1: Steady-state equilibrium
4 Ination, unemployment and economic growth
In this section, we explore the relationship between ination, unemployment and economic growth.
Section 3.1 considers the e¤ects of ination via the CIA constraint on R&D (i.e.,  > 0 and  = 0).
Section 3.2 considers the e¤ects of ination via the CIA constraint on consumption (i.e.,  = 0
and  > 0).
4.1 Ination via the CIA constraint on R&D
In this subsection, we explore the e¤ects of ination on unemployment and economic growth under
the CIA constraint on R&D. From the Fisher identity, we have i =  + r =  + + g, where the
second equality uses the Euler equation and _ct=ct = _At=At = g. Therefore, a one-unit increase in
the ination rate leads to a one-unit increase in the nominal interest rate in the long run.33 In
Figure 1, we see that an increase in the nominal interest rate i (caused by an increase in ination
) shifts the FE curve to the left reducing labor market tightness  and the level of technology .
As for the resulting e¤ect on unemployment u, we see from (29) that unemployment u = x=M()
(where  and x are determined by exogenous parameters and independent of i) is decreasing in the
job-nding rate M(). Therefore, the increase in ination  raises unemployment u by reducing
labor market tightness  and the job-nding rate M(). From (14), aggregate R&D is given
by R = ; therefore, higher ination  (that decreases the level of technology ) also reduces
R&D. Now we consider the e¤ect of ination on economic growth. The dynamics of technology
t  At=ht is given by _t=t = _At=At   g. Therefore, given that higher ination  decreases
33For example, Mishkin (1992) and Booth and Ciner (2001) provide empirical evidence for a positive relationship
between ination and the nominal interest rate in the long run.
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the steady-state value of , it must also decrease the growth rate of At temporarily such that
_At=At < g before t reaches the new steady state. We summarize all these results in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 Under the CIA constraint on R&D, higher ination has (a) a positive e¤ect on
unemployment, (b) a negative e¤ect on R&D, (c) a negative e¤ect on the growth rate of technology
in the short run, and (d) a negative e¤ect on the level of technology in the long run.
Proof. Proven in text.
The intuition of Proposition 1 can be explained as follows. Higher ination leads to an increase
in the opportunity cost of cash holdings, which in turn increases the cost of R&D investment
via the CIA constraint on R&D. As a result, R&D decreases resulting into a lower growth rate
of technology in the short run and a lower level of technology in the long run. The negative
relationship between ination and R&D is consistent with the empirical evidence based on cross-
sectional regressions in Chu and Lai (2013) and panel regressions in Chu, Cozzi, Lai and Liao
(2014). The negative relationship between ination and economic growth is also supported by the
cross-country evidence in Fischer (1993), Guerrero (2006) and Vaona (2012). Although the rate
of creative destruction decreases temporarily, the decrease in innovation in the long run increases
the number of unemployed workers relative to labor-market vacancies, causing a negative e¤ect on
labor-market tightness and a positive e¤ect on long-run unemployment. In other words, via the
CIA constraint on R&D, ination increases long-run unemployment by decreasing the demand for
labor. Therefore, under the CIA constraint on R&D, ination and unemployment have a positive
relationship in the long run, and this theoretical result is consistent with empirical studies, such
as Ireland (1999), Beyer and Farmer (2007), Russell and Banerjee (2008) and Berentsen et al.
(2011) who consider data in the US. In Section 2, we also nd a positive e¤ect of ination on
unemployment via the nancial friction faced by rms, which is a proxy for the CIA constraint on
R&D.
Finally, it is easy to see from the FE condition in (28) and Proposition 1 that relaxing the
liquidity constraint on R&D (i.e., a decrease in ) would reduce unemployment and increase R&D
and innovation.
4.2 Ination via the CIA constraint on consumption
In this subsection, we explore the e¤ects of ination on unemployment and economic growth under
the CIA constraint on consumption. In this case, Figure 1 shows that an increase in ination 
shifts the LM curve to the right increasing labor market tightness  and decreasing the level of
technology . As for the resulting e¤ect on unemployment u, we see from (29) that unemployment
u = x=M() is decreasing in the job-nding rate M(). Therefore, the increase in ination 
reduces unemployment u. From (14), aggregate R&D is given by R = ; therefore, the higher
ination  also reduces R&D. As for the e¤ect of ination on economic growth, given that ination
 decreases the steady-state value of , it must decrease the growth rate of At temporarily before
t reaches the new steady state. We summarize these results in Proposition 2.
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Proposition 2 Under the CIA constraint on consumption, higher ination has (a) a negative
e¤ect on unemployment, (b) a negative e¤ect on R&D, (c) a negative e¤ect on the growth rate of
technology in the short run, and (d) a negative e¤ect on the level of technology in the long run.
Proof. Proven in text.
The intuition behind the negative relationship between ination and unemployment can be
explained as follows. Higher ination leads to an increase in the opportunity cost of cash holdings,
which in turn increases the cost of consumption relative to leisure. As a result, the household
consumes more leisure and reduces labor supply. The decrease in labor supply reduces R&D
labor and also the number of workers searching for employment. The resulting increase in labor-
market tightness decreases unemployment. In other words, via the CIA constraint on consumption,
ination decreases unemployment by decreasing the supply of labor. Therefore, under the CIA
constraint on consumption, ination and unemployment have a negative relationship, and this
theoretical result is consistent with empirical studies, such as Dolado et al. (2000) and Karanassou
et al. (2005, 2008) who consider data in Europe and the US. In Section 2, we also nd a negative
e¤ect of ination on unemployment via the nancial friction faced by consumers, which is a proxy
for the CIA constraint on consumption.
Finally, it is easy to see from (30) and Proposition 2 that relaxing the liquidity constraint on
consumption (i.e., a decrease in ) would increase unemployment, R&D and innovation.
5 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we rst calibrate the model to US data to explore its quantitative implications. To
facilitate this analysis, we follow the standard approach in the literature to specify a Cobb-Douglas
matching function F (vt; ut) = 'v
"
tu
1 "
t , where the parameter ' > 0 captures matching e¢ciency
and the parameter " 2 (0; 1) is the elasticity of matches with respect to vacancies. Given this
matching function, the job-nding rate is t = '
"
t , and the vacancy-lling rate is t = '
" 1
t .
The model features the following structural parameters f; "; ; g; b; z; q; ; '; ; g and a policy
instrument . We follow Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) to set the discount rate  to 0.05. We follow
Berentsen et al. (2011) to set " = 1   = 0:28, so that the elasticity of matches with respect to
vacancies is equal to the bargaining power of rms satisfying the Hosios (1990) rule. We consider
a long-run technology growth rate g of 1% and a long-run ination rate  of 3%. Then, we
calibrate the remaining parameters fb; z; q; ; '; ; g by matching theoretical moments to data.
We calibrate b to match data on unemployment benets as a ratio of per capita income, which
is about one quarter in the US. We calibrate the markup ratio z to match data on R&D as a
share of GDP, which is about 3% in the US. We calibrate the quality step size q, which determines
 = g= ln q, to match a long-run unemployment rate u=l of 6% in the US. We calibrate the leisure
parameter  to match the ratio of labor force to the working-age population (aged 16 to 64),
which is about three quarters in the US. We calibrate matching e¢ciency ' to match a long-run
job-nding rate  of 0.3, as estimated in Hall (2005). We calibrate the CIA-R&D parameter 
to match the semi-elasticity of R&D/GDP with respect to ination @ ln(R&D=GDP )=@ = 0:4
estimated in Chu, Cozzi, Lai and Liao (2015). We calibrate the CIA-consumption parameter  to
match the money-output ratio m=y. We consider two conventional measures of money: M0 and
M1. In the US, the average M0-output ratio is about 0.06, whereas the average M1-output ratio
is about 0.12. The calibrated parameter values are summarized in Table 3.
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Table 3: Calibrated parameter values for the US
 "  g b z q  '  
M0 0.05 0.28 0.72 0.01 0.25 1.30 1.65 0.25 0.17 0.43 0.05
M1 0.05 0.28 0.72 0.01 0.25 1.30 1.65 0.25 0.16 0.04 0.12
Given the above parameter values, we proceed to simulate the long-run Phillips curve (with
ination on the horizontal axis) in this calibrated US economy. Figure 2a shows an upward-sloping
Phillips curve under the M0 specication, whereas Figure 2b shows a downward-sloping Phillips
curve under the M1 specication. The intuition behind these contrasting results can be explained
as follows. Under the M0 specication, the relatively low money-output ratio implies a small
degree of CIA on consumption (i.e., a small ). As a result, in order to match the empirical
semi-elasticity of R&D with respect to ination, the degree of CIA on R&D must be relatively
large (i.e., a large ). In this case, the e¤ect of ination on unemployment works through mainly
the R&D channel giving rise to a positive relationship between the two variables. Under the M1
specication, the relatively high money-output ratio implies a larger degree of CIA on consumption
(i.e., a larger ), which in turn is almost su¢cient to deliver the empirical semi-elasticity of R&D
with respect to ination. As a result, the implied degree of CIA on R&D becomes much smaller
(i.e., a much smaller ). In this case, the e¤ect of ination on unemployment works through mainly
the consumption-leisure tradeo¤ giving rise to a negative relationship between the two variables.
This ambiguous relationship between ination and unemployment in the US is consistent with the
contrasting empirical results in the literature.
Figure 2a Figure 2b
In the rest of this section, we recalibrate the model to the Eurozone, which features lower
R&D, higher unemployment, lower job-nding rate, higher unemployment benets and higher
money-output ratio than the US. Specically, we consider an R&D-output ratio of 2%, a long-run
unemployment rate of 9%, an average job-nding rate  of 0.07,34 and unemployment benets as
a ratio of per capita income of 0.4.35 Finally, we consider the two measures of money as before:
an average M0-output ratio of 0.08, and an average M1-output ratio of 0.4. Table 4 summarizes
the calibrated parameter values.
34See Hobijn and Sahin (2009) for estimates of the job-nding rates in a number of European countries.
35See Esser et al. (2013) for data on unemployment benets in European countries.
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Table 4: Calibrated parameter values for the Eurozone
 "  g b z q  '  
M0 0.05 0.28 0.72 0.01 0.40 1.26 4.03 0.21 0.09 0.38 0.07
M1 0.05 0.28 0.72 0.01 0.40 1.26 4.03 0.20 0.09 0.02 0.40
Given the above parameter values, we proceed to simulate the long-run Phillips curve in this
calibrated European economy. Figures 3a shows a downward-sloping Phillips curve under the
M0 specication, whereas Figure 3b also shows a downward-sloping Phillips curve under the M1
specication. The reason why the Phillips curve is always downward sloping in this case is the
stronger CIA friction on consumption, which in turn is implied by the higher money-output ratio
in the Eurozone. Under the M0 specication, the calibrated value for the CIA-consumption
parameter  is 0.07, compared to  = 0:05 in the US. The stronger CIA friction on consumption in
Europe implies that the e¤ect of ination on unemployment works through the consumption-leisure
tradeo¤ giving rise to a negative relationship between ination and unemployment even under the
M0 specication. This nding of a downward-sloping Phillips curve in Europe is consistent with
the empirical evidence in Dolado et al. (2000) and Karanassou et al. (2008).
Figure 3a Figure 3b
6 Conclusion
In this study, we have explored a fundamental question in economics that is the long-run rela-
tionship between ination, unemployment and economic growth. We consider a standard Schum-
peterian growth model with the additions of money demand via CIA constraints and equilibrium
unemployment driven by matching frictions in the labor market. In this monetary growth-theoretic
framework with search frictions, we discover a positive (negative) relationship between ination
and unemployment under the CIA constraint on R&D (consumption), a negative relationship
between ination and R&D, and a negative relationship between ination and economic growth.
These theoretical predictions are consistent with the stylized facts that we have documented.
Our theoretical results are also consistent with a recent experience in the US economy. After
the Great Recession, the Federal Reserves lowered the interest rate, and the economy experienced
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low ination and low unemployment but modest gains in growth. Our model with semi-endogenous
growth and an upward-sloping Phillips curve in the US could replicate these relationships.
Another important policy implication from our analysis is that monetary expansion could be
useful to reduce the rather high unemployment rate in the Eurozone given a downward-sloping
Phillips curve there, but that it would come at the expense of innovation and long-run technological
competitiveness. A better policy prescription for the European banking authorities would be to
manage to ease the liquidity problems that plague R&D activities. According to our results, this
policy, unlike monetary expansion, would at the same time decrease unemployment and increase
growth and technological competitiveness.
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Appendix A
Table A1: E¤ects of ination on unemployment (tightened "considerably")
All banks Large banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BF  Ination 1.805 1.205 1.593 1.686* 1.204 1.864
(1.390) (1.365) (2.291) (0.972) (0.958) (1.551)
BC  Ination -2.541* -2.541* -3.183 -2.460** -2.460** -3.454**
(1.408) (1.365) (2.324) (1.101) (1.068) (1.729)
RD  BF  Ination 19.531*** 19.685*** 15.682*** 15.718***
(6.953) (7.117) (5.517) (5.648)
RD  BF -69.315*** -69.696*** -55.774*** -55.863***
(20.061) (20.423) (16.298) (16.589)
RD  Ination -3.964 -4.821 -2.695 -2.963
(22.425) (23.867) (22.299) (23.727)
Ination, BF and BC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls No No Yes No No Yes
Industry xed e¤ect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 252 252 252 252 252 252
R-squared 0.315 0.365 0.406 0.320 0.369 0.406
Notes: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1. The rst three columns correspond to lending policy
reported by all banks, whereas the last three columns correspond to lending policy reported by
large banks. In all columns, we control ination, bank policy for rms (BF) and bank policy for
consumers (BC). In columns (3) and (6), we further control GDP per capita, log trade volume
and industry-specifc time trends.
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Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 1. First, we restrict the range of values for  to ensure that (a)  = M() <
1 (i.e., the number of workers who nd jobs at a given point in time must be less than the number
of workers searching for jobs at that time), (b)  =M()= < 1 (i.e., the number of vacancies lled
at a given point in time must be less than the number of vacancies on the market at that time),
and (c)  >  so that f = = < 1 (i.e., the number of industries with unlaunched innovations
must be less than the total number of industries, which is normalized to unity). Then, we examine
each term on the right-hand side of (28) separately. The rst term in (28) is independent of ,
whereas the second term in (28) is decreasing in  given that ~ increases with . The third term
in (28) can be reexpressed as
#()  
+ e + (1 + e
+
)
+ e + (1 + e
+
)(1  )=(1  z)
. (B1)
Given (1  )=(1  z) > 1, we can show that #0() < 0 holds if36
f[1  =M()]2= + 1g= > 1=M 0(), (B2)
which holds if  is su¢ciently large because 1  =M() = 1  = > 0. As for the fourth term in
(28), noting  = M()= and ~ = =[1  =M()], we can show that 0() < 0 holds if and only
if37



[1  =M()]2 +
2 [1  =M()] =M()
=M() + 1

| {z }
()
> 1. (B3)
Note that () > 0 because  > 0 and 1   =M() = 1   = > 0. Therefore, we can conclude
this proof by saying that a large value of  is a su¢cient (but not necessary) condition for the FE
curve in (28) to be downward sloping in .
Proof of Lemma 2. By (30) and (B1), l(i; )=L = 1   #()(1 + i)=(b). From the proof of
Lemma 1, #() is decreasing in  if  is su¢ciently large. Together with (31), one can easily show
that the LM curve is upward sloping in .
36Note that #0() < 0 holds if and only if
(+ e)" 1 + e
+ 
!#0
> e0 1 + e
+ 
!
,
which can be expressed as
(+ e)"e0 (+ )  0e
(+ )
2
#
> [e0  (+ e)0] 1 + e
+ 
!
.
Given 0 > 0; 0 < 0; and ~
0
> 0; this holds if ~
0
   ( + ~)0 < 0; which is equivalent to (B2) by  = M();
~ = = [1  =M()] ; and ~
0
= ~
2
[M()  M 0()] =M()2: Note that M() > M 0() by the properties of M().
37Note that
0() =
{
0()
[1  {()]
2
[{() + 1]
2

   

[1  {()]
2
+
2{() [1  {()]
{() + 1

,
where {()  =M() and thus {0() > 0.
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